CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CCD/276
24 February 1970
Original: ENGLISH

THE NETHERLANDS

Working Paper Containing Some Introductory Remarks on Steps Toward a Comprehensive Disarmament Programme

1. In resolution 1722 (XVI) of 20 December 1961 by which the General Assembly endorsed the agreement reached on the composition of the ENDC, it was recommended that the new Disarmament Committee should undertake negotiations with a view to reaching, on the basis of the joint statement of agreed principles, agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The Committee should in its work take into account, inter alia, paragraph 8 of the aforementioned principles.

2. Paragraph 8 of the agreed principles stipulates that efforts should continue without interruption until agreement upon the total programme for general and complete disarmament has been achieved. Furthermore, efforts should be undertaken to ensure early agreement on and implementation of measures of disarmament without prejudicing progress on agreement on the total programme and in such a way that these measures would facilitate and form part of that programme.

3. Since then progress has been made first and foremost in the field of collateral measures. But for reasons which are well known the hope that the main task of the Committee could be dealt with without interruption, "as a matter of the utmost urgency" (Res. 1722 (XVI)), remained unfulfilled.

In the course of its existence the Committee "gradually concentrated more of its efforts on the partial and confidence-building, or collateral measures of disarmament, as they are usually called, than on general and complete disarmament".*/ This trend is discernible in the Provisional Agenda of work of the Committee, adopted in August 1968. Likewise, in its report to the XXIVth session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Committee recognizes "the relationship of the various measures already achieved and those currently being considered toward the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control".

*/ The U.N. and Disarmament 1945-1965, chapter 6, page 115.

4. Mainly as a result of the initiatives of the Romanian delegation (ENDC/PV.400) and of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the XXIVth session of the General Assembly declared the seventies as a Disarmament Decade. Disarmament and social and economic development are the main objectives of all mankind for the coming years.

5. In the relevant resolution the General Assembly endorses the view that general and complete disarmament is the ultimate goal. Toward that end, the Assembly requests this Committee:

1. to continue intensive negotiations with a view to reaching the widest possible agreement on collateral measures;
2. to work out a comprehensive programme, dealing with all aspects on the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament, under effective international control, which would provide the Committee with a guideline to chart the course of its further work and its negotiations.

6. In its last report to the General Assembly the Committee expressed its conviction of the continued need to give highest priority in its work to further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, with due consideration to maintaining a balance among various measures to prevent armament, to limit armament and of disarmament. As regards the first category some measure of success has been achieved.

7. As to the second the most hopeful event during the Committee's past session was the announcement in Moscow and Washington that discussions on the limitation of offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defense against ballistic missiles would start shortly.

The Netherlands delegation fully shares the opinion that the strategic arms limitation talks, which had a promising beginning, are of the utmost importance. They may create a new and more rational relationship in the strategic balance of the two super-powers. Their successful outcome would certainly facilitate the conclusion of further measures in the field of armaments limitation and ultimately of disarmament.

8. This should not imply, however, that no efforts are to be made in the meantime to further new agreements on such other measures. Although it is understood that there is a close relationship and interdependence between SALT and a comprehensive test ban, the Netherlands Delegation is nevertheless of the opinion that early preparatory work for a close international co-operation in the seismological field should continue to receive high priority in this context. Without prejudice to the eventual shaping of a verification system in a comprehensive test ban treaty, methods of seismological detection and identification will in any case constitute a fundamental element of such a system. Therefore, the Netherlands Delegation attaches great importance to the implementation and follow-up of the General Assembly Resolution on a world-wide exchange of seismological data.

It remains of the opinion that the question of a cut-off of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes should be examined more closely by the Committee (CCD/PV.432).

9. The Netherlands Delegation shares the view of the Italian Delegation as expressed in documents ENDC/245 and ENDC/263 that pending final results of the bilateral talks on vertical non-proliferation new and continued efforts should be made to prevent horizontal proliferation. During this session of the Committee the curtain on the Disarmament Decade could be raised by reaching agreement on the final text of a treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof.

10. Measures of non-armament and arms limitation certainly contribute to the creation of a climate of mutual confidence, which may pave the way to reach the final objective of general and complete disarmament. But apart from being an aid to "confidence-building", such measures have, of course, also an intrinsic merit of their own. They should not be limited to the nuclear field.

Much time of this Committee will certainly be devoted to the conclusion of new agreements regarding chemical and biological warfare.

Within the framework of the Disarmament Decade, efforts should also be made to reduce and eliminate conventional arms races. In this respect attention should be paid to the increasing build-up of arsenals and to the international trade in conventional armaments. The S.I.P.R.I. Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament gives an alarming picture of the dangers involved.

11. Finally, with regard to the third category mentioned in paragraph 6, it would appear that concrete negotiations on real disarmament measures can only start fruitfully, when the preparatory phase of partial measures and confidence building has been sufficiently successful.

This, however, does not exclude that during the preparatory phase attention be devoted to the problems of general and complete disarmament. In this respect the joint statement of agreed principles still serves its purpose of being a guideline for the disarmament process as a whole. Nevertheless, as suggested by the Italian Delegation in ENDC/245, it might be considered whether this statement could be suitably supplemented. In the opinion of the Netherlands Delegation this should preferably be done in the form of an additional formulation rather than as a restatement of those principles, thus leaving the standing and validity of the joint declaration of 1961 itself intact.

12. The implementation of a comprehensive programme in the field of arms control and disarmament is closely linked with further developments and progress in the overall political world situation. The three cornerstones are: Disarmament, International Security and Peace.

During our last session several delegations referred to United Nations General Assembly resolution 2454 (XXIII) requesting this Committee to renew its effort to make progress toward general and complete disarmament. The Netherlands Delegation is of the opinion that during the preliminary phase studies could take place on the question of general and complete disarmament. The Indian Delegation (ENDC/PV.404) called on the United States and the USSR to submit revised versions of their draft treaties concerning general and complete disarmament. The Polish Delegation (ENDC/PV.406) proposed more specifically that the two Co-Chairmen prepare a new draft for the <u>first</u> stage of disarmament. An alternative approach might also be considered by the Committee, namely to start with an examination of the characteristics and requirements of the <u>final</u> stage of a process of general and complete disarmament. On the basis of such a study it could be tried subsequently to trace out a route along which this final stage can be reached. A similar method was proposed by the Swedish Delegation as far back as 1964 (ENDC/PV.202). Perhaps it could offer the advantage of getting a better insight in the political requirements and structural needs of a disarming world.

13. The consideration of a comprehensive programme inevitably raises the questions of priorities and deadlines. In this connexion reference should be made to the proposal of Sweden (ENDC/PV.397) for "balanced package deals" and of India for a "selective approach" (ENDC/PV.404).

It is, of course, in the nature of things, when there is a whole range of topics, to establish some sort of order of priorities. However, in the opinion of the Netherlands delegation such a list can only be of a very tentative character. It should be flexible and may be subject to change - as has already been shown in the past - in as much as the political realities of the moment require. One should not overlook that the "partial measures" which have been adopted or are now under discussion, are, in fact, elements of different stages of the proposals for general and complete disarmament.

The very character of negotiations on arms control and disarmament is ill suited to set any meaningful timetables in the context of a "Decade". It remains to be seen what the net result will be at the end of the ten year period. No amount of pressure, nor the best efforts of the Committee to meet certain "target" dates can alter that fact. It is unlikely that a precise schedule and fixed time spans would be helpful in achieving the very goal we are trying to reach. It would therefore be undesirable to establish too rigid a programme of work or to assume that it will be possible strictly to adhere to any particular pattern.

Of course, it is a quite different matter to agree on a certain sequence of measures, to be carried out within specified periods of time, in a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament.

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CCD/277
5 March 1970

ENGLISH
Original: SPANISH

MEXICO

Working paper containing some comments and suggestions for making the Committee on Disarmament more effective

1. In its statement on 17 February, at the first meeting of the 1970 session of the Committee on Disarmament, the Mexican delegation clearly explained its view that the Committee should help to commemorate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations by doing its utmost to achieve substantial progress, preferably on all four of the following questions the Committee is working on: Disarmament Decade, prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests, chemical and micro-biological weapons, and treaty on the reservation of the sea-bed and the ocean floor exclusively for peaceful purposes.

2. Previously, at the 1691st meeting of the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, held on 17 November 1969, the Mexican representative in that Committee had reviewed a number of constitutional questions (happily since resolved by General Assembly resolution 2602 B (XXIV)) and procedural matters connected with the Committee's work; outlining certain conclusions and indicating the intention of his delegation to revert to the subject in due course in this Committee.

3. This working paper is thus inspired by the two statements to which I have referred and is also related, so far as one of the points discussed in it is concerned, to the study recently published by the International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) entitled "The ENDC and the Press". The purpose of this paper is to present some specific comments and suggestions which, in the Mexican delegation's opinion, could increase the effectiveness of the Committee's work in the immediate future.

Disarmament Decade

4. It is well known how modest the achievements of the Committee on Disarmament have been so far. The few agreements on collateral measures which it has already reached and which, hopefully, it may achieve in the near future should not obscure the fact that the question of general and complete disarmament under effective international control is still, and must continue to be, the basic purpose, the ultimate objective, and the very raison d'être of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

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5. That is what makes most timely and deserving of special support resolution 2602 E (XXIV), adopted by the General Assembly on 16 December, in which the Assembly declared the decade which is now beginning as a "Disarmament Decade", and requested the Committee "to work out ... a comprehensive programme, dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control, which would provide the Conference with a guideline to chart the course of its further work and its negotiations, and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session."

6. The Mexican delegation considers that this is a task which both because of its importance and because it has been relatively neglected in previous years should be accorded priority in the Committee's efforts. It also believes that, for the preparation of the comprehensive programme called for by the General Assembly, it would be highly desirable for the Committee to know, at least in broad outline, the present position of the two States, which act as Co-Chairmen on the subject-matter to be covered by the programme in question, so as to have a realistic and effective basis for the work entrusted to it in the above-mentioned resolution.

7. It will be recalled that, in 1962, the Committee received separate draft treaties from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America: the text submitted by the Soviet Union is contained in documents ENDC/2, ENDC/2/Add.1 and ENDC/2/Rev.1, and that submitted by the United States of America will be found in documents ENDC/30, ENDC/30/Add.1 and ENDC/30/Add.2.

8. Although these two texts are still officially before the Committee, it is very probable that, as almost a decade has elapsed since they were drafted and in view of what has since taken place in disarmament negotiations, they are no longer an accurate reflection of the present position of their authors as regards the question of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. For this reason, it is extremely advisable that the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union should submit revised versions of their respective drafts to the Committee, amended as they may deem necessary to reflect faithfully their position as at present.

Treaty on the reservation of the sea-bed and the ocean floor exclusively for peaceful purposes

9. The extensive and valuable debate that took place on this subject at the General Assembly's last session would appear to make its recapitulation in this Committee unnecessary, especially as, in addition to the records of the First Committee, there are various working papers which were submitted in New York and which contain a number of concrete suggestions for improving the draft prepared by the Co-Chairmen and reproduced in annex A to the Committee's report to the Assembly on its work in 1969.

10. In view of the stage that this subject has reached, perhaps the most constructive and appropriate procedure might be to establish a sub-committee of the whole, as suggested by the Mexican delegation on 17 February, or a smaller working group, as indicated by the Swedish delegation on 18 February or, if neither procedure is generally acceptable, to hold some informal meetings at which the bilateral consultations between the Co-Chairmen would be supplemented by a frank and clear presentation of the views of the other delegations represented in the Committee, so as to facilitate the preparation of a revised draft, offering the greatest likelihood of success.

11. Whatever may be the procedure adopted to prepare the draft treaty in question, it would appear essential that:

(a) the text of the draft should be acceptable to all members of the Committee;

(b) its preparation should be completed sufficiently in advance of the opening of the General Assembly to permit it to be duly studied by the Governments of all the other States Members of the world organization not represented in this Committee, so as to make it more likely that it will become one of the documents whose signature is intended to add lustre to the anniversary session of the United Nations, and

(c) in its work on the draft, the Committee should bear very much in mind the need for ensuring that that work does not result in a concentration of its activities in 1970 prejudicial to the adoption of other disarmament measures of greater importance which constitute urgent matters in the Committee's programme.

Calendar of meetings of the Committee

12. For a body such as the Committee on Disarmament, it is no doubt very useful and appropriate to have sufficient latitude to decide each year, as circumstances require,

what the calendar of its session should be. That, however, does not prevent the adoption of a minimum of rules which may themselves be flexible. On the contrary, the Mexican delegation believes that it would promote the smooth progress of the Committee's work. It therefore wishes to reiterate the suggestion it made last November in the First Committee of the General Assembly to the effect that a minimum of stability should be ensured as regards the annual opening and closing of the Committee's sessions. For example, the third Tuesday in January might be fixed as the opening date, and as to the closing date it should be decided that it should never be later than the third Tuesday in September, which, it will be remembered, is when the General Assembly begins its regular sessions.

Drafting of the Committee's annual report

13. Certain unfortunate circumstances brought out by the Committee's 1969 report, which were carefully analysed in the Mexican delegation's statement in the First Committee on 17 November 1969, have emphasized the need to adopt an appropriate procedure for the drafting of the annual report so that it faithfully reflects the facts and situations it describes and its contents are approved both by the two Co-Chairmen and by all the other members of the Committee.

14. To achieve this, it might be sufficient to employ the procedure used in the Fifth and Sixth Committees of the General Assembly which, as modified for the needs of the Committee on Disarmament, might consist of the following:

(a) Sufficiently before the end of the session, the Co-Chairmen would give the Secretariat general directives regarding the form and substance of the report in question, so that the preparation of a preliminary draft may be started at the appropriate time.

(b) The preliminary draft, prepared by the Secretariat in accordance with the Co-Chairmen's directives, would be submitted to them and after any changes they request are incorporated, it would be reproduced as the draft report and circulated to all the other members of the Committee, preferably about a month before, but in any case not less than two weeks before, the end of its session.

(c) The draft report would be discussed at as many informal or formal meetings as may be necessary. Whatever changes may be required to ensure that the final text is unanimously adopted would be made.

Publicity of results of formal meetings

15. In view of the very serious dangers which the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, poses for the whole world, so much so that experts have said that basically what is at stake is the very survival of mankind, it is not surprising that all peoples have a special interest in closely following the work on disarmament.

16. It is true that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is in part in the nature of a "negotiating body", so that a certain amount of discretion is necessary with respect to such activity. At the same time, however, it should be remembered that this is only one aspect of its work. There is another aspect which is no less important, that of its being a "deliberating body", and in that respect there does not seem to be any reason whatever to justify continuation of the method of private meetings which has been followed so far. Actually, the Committee's official or formal meetings, at which each representative confines himself to reading a carefully prepared text, are in no way different from the meetings at which year after year the First Committee of the General Assembly discusses the Committee's report and examines all questions relating to disarmament.

17. The Mexican delegation has consequently reached the conclusion that it would be highly advisable henceforth to make such meetings public, like those of the First Committee referred to. The adoption of such a decision would have obvious advantages so far as informing world opinion is concerned, including that of the presence at such meetings of the journalists accredited to the European Office of the United Nations who wished to attend and who would be able to use first-hand, complete and up-to-date documentation, to which they have hitherto as a rule had sufficiently early access only in general and incomplete terms and which has been made available to them in its totality so belatedly that it no longer served the need for news of topical interest, of capital importance to the Press. The Committee itself would gain from such a system, because it would help its work to become better known and, as is clear from the SIPRI study referred to in paragraph 3, there seem to be no disadvantages to using it and many potentially positive results.

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CCD/278
10 March 1970
Original: ENGLISH

YUGOSLAVIA

Declaration
by the Government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in connexion with the Ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

In connexion with the adoption by the Federal Assembly of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the Law on the Ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Government of Yugoslavia wishes to reaffirm its conviction that the Treaty will contribute to the cessation of the nuclear arms race, facilitate the setting in motion of the process of nuclear disarmament and stimulate the trend towards general and complete disarmament. The Government of Yugoslavia attaches great importance to further efforts by all countries to create a universal system of international security that would ensure a lasting peace and create conditions for an accelerated development in the whole world. Although the realization of this objective necessarily calls for an essential change in the existing practices in international relations, which are so often characterized by inequality, interference in internal affairs of other countries and the power policy, the Government of Yugoslavia considers that the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and similar collateral measures, can constitute a beneficial contribution to the search for peace and international security.

On this occasion the Government of Yugoslavia wishes to recall that prior to the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had been exerting efforts, together with other countries, to eliminate some of its deficiencies in order to make it more acceptable to the non-nuclear-weapon states. These efforts have produced definite results. Many of these positions are contained in the memorandum of the Government of Yugoslavia to the United Nations Commission on Disarmament dated 3 May 1965 and in the Statement of 11 April 1968, issued by the Government of Yugoslavia relating to the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In this connexion the Government of Yugoslavia wishes to set forth the motives and expectations which have guided it in proposing to the Federal Assembly to ratify the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The Government of Yugoslavia, viewing this Treaty against the background of the search for peace, general and complete disarmament, international security and development,

1. Considers the ban on the development, manufacture and use of nuclear weapons and the destruction of all stockpiles of them to be indispensable for the maintenance of a stable peace and international security, and expects the nuclear-weapon powers to display, with this objective in mind, their willingness to conclude a convention on the general renunciation of the threat on use of nuclear weapons.

2. Holds the view that the chief responsibility for the progress in this direction rests with the nuclear-weapon powers and expects them to show maximum good will and determination to embark upon that road, a matter made obligatory upon them also by the fact that non-nuclear-weapon states, party to the Treaty have voluntarily renounced to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

3. Expects that the already initiated talks between the super powers relating to containment and cessation of the race in the development and production of the strategic nuclear arms will be expanded also to the so-called tactical nuclear weapons and lead to the prohibition of the stationing of these arms in the areas free thereof, to the withdrawal from alien territories within one's own state borders and to the discontinuance of the training of the non-nuclear-weapon states' armed forces in the use of nuclear weapons, creating thereby favourable conditions for even more far-reaching measures in the field of nuclear disarmament.

4. Lends its support to every action aimed at creating nuclear-weapon-free zones and the thinned armament zones, as significant measures for the easing of tensions and strengthening of international security.

5. Notes that the continuance of nuclear weapons test is inconsistent with the spirit and letter of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and considers it indispensable for the nuclear-weapon powers to initiate, at an early date, negotiations for the completion of the Moscow Agreement.

6. Attaches special importance to finding a satisfactory solution to the problem of safeguarding the security of non-nuclear-weapon states and expects nuclear-weapon powers, on one hand, to undertake not to use nuclear weapons against the countries having renounced them as well as against non-nuclear-weapon states in general, and to refrain from the threat to use them, and, on the other hand, expects that in the event of such a threat, the United Nations will act in a manner as shall ensure effective protection of the non-nuclear-weapon states.

7. Considers that the Non-Proliferation Treaty makes all the states parties entitled to full and unhampered utilization, on a non-discriminatory basis, of all the achievements of nuclear activities for peaceful purposes, including nuclear explosions, through appropriate international procedures yet to be established.

8. Believes that all countries will be ensured the same treatment with regard to the contents and modalities of control of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and that the expenditure for the system of control will be regulated in a way not burdening the non-nuclear-weapon states and, in particular, the developing countries.

9. Requests the nuclear-weapon states parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to render all the appropriate assistance to the non-nuclear-weapon states in the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and expects the International Atomic Energy Agency to adjust itself more fully to the current needs of the international community, particularly to those of the developing countries.

The Government of Yugoslavia emphasizes once again the great significance it attaches to the universality of the efforts relating to the realization of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, in the belief that all the states parties will make their greatest possible contribution to have the spirit and letter of the Non-Proliferation Treaty fully, and constructively applied, in order to facilitate, inter alia, the accession of all countries to the Treaty.

Beograd, 27 February 1970.

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CCD/279
6 March 1970

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Statement by A.N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, at the Ceremony for the deposit of Instruments of Ratification of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

5 March 1970

Comrades,

Ladies and gentlemen,

We are participating in an event of great international importance. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons enters into force today. Allow me, on behalf of the Soviet Government, to express deep gratification in this connexion.

Ever since nuclear weapons made their appearance, the policy of the Soviet Union has been invariably directed towards ridding mankind of the threat of nuclear war. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is an important step towards this objective, since it sets up a definite barrier to the further proliferation of such dangerous weapons of mass destruction as nuclear weapons.

Under the basic provisions of the Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to transfer such weapons to any recipient whatsoever, either directly or indirectly, and not to assist third parties in their manufacture or acquisition. Non-nuclear-weapon States, for their part, undertake not to manufacture or acquire such weapons.

This Treaty has met with wide international acceptance; it has been signed by almost 100 States. Now, with the Treaty's entry into force, the obligation to refrain from the proliferation of nuclear weapons becomes one of the most important standards of international law. Even those States which are not parties to the Treaty cannot fail to take this international standard into account. On them too lies the responsibility as to whether a limit will be set to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union, as a Party to the Treaty, has no desire to obtain any unilateral advantages for itself. We are guided above all by the desire to ensure the security and peaceful life of the peoples, and also to save future generations from the

calamities of war. It is precisely for the sake of this lofty purpose that the Treaty must prevent the proliferation of lethal nuclear weapons in the world. At the same time, the benefits of the peaceful application of nuclear technology are to be made available for peaceful purposes to all States Parties to the Treaty.

The entry into force of the Non-Proliferation Treaty places serious problems before the Parties to it. This applies above all to the question of control. Control must be reliable and must be put into operation within the time-limits laid down by the Treaty.

As is well known, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons still does not eliminate the nuclear weapons themselves. For this reason it is very important at present that the nuclear Powers, and all other countries, should do everything possible to put an end to the nuclear arms race and to make progress in the cause of general and complete disarmament. The interest of a healthier international situation urgently call for this.

The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries deem it necessary to go further along this road and call upon all States to show their goodwill and readiness in practice to set about genuine disarmament. We for our part are making unremitting efforts, also within the Geneva Committee on Disarmament, to achieve agreement on the cessation of the arms race, in the first place the nuclear missile race, and on the elaboration of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. The representative of the Soviet Union in the Geneva Committee has instructions from the Soviet Government to strive for the earliest possible conclusion of an international convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological weapons and on the destruction of such weapons, and of a treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof.

The Soviet Government attaches great importance to the dialogue with the United States which began at the end of last year on questions in regard to curbing the strategic arms race. We are now preparing with the utmost earnestness for negotiations on these questions which are to begin at Vienna in April of this year. The outcome of these negotiations depends, of course, on the goodwill of the two sides.

In conclusion, allow me to express the confidence that today's deposit of the instruments of ratification by the Soviet Union, the United States and other States, signifying the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, will serve as a good stimulus towards the Treaty's acquiring a general, genuinely universal character. This is an important and necessary treaty, which meets the interests of all States and all peoples.

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CCD/279/Rev.1
11 March 1970

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Statement by A.N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, at the Ceremony for the deposit of Instruments of Ratification of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

5 March 1970

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This Treaty has met with wide international acceptance; it has been signed by almost 100 States. Now, with the Treaty's entry into force, the obligation to refrain from the proliferation of nuclear weapons becomes one of the most important standards of international law. Even those States which are not parties to the Treaty cannot fail to take this international standard into account. On them too lies the responsibility as to whether a limit will be set to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, a matter in which the whole of mankind is interested.

The Soviet Union, as a Party to the Treaty, has no desire to obtain any unilateral advantages for itself. We are guided above all by the desire to ensure the security and peaceful life of the peoples, and also to save future generations from the

calamities of war. It is precisely for the sake of this lofty purpose that the Treaty must prevent the proliferation of lethal nuclear weapons in the world. At the same time, the benefits of the peaceful application of nuclear technology are to be made available for peaceful purposes to all States Parties to the Treaty.

The entry into force of the Non-Proliferation Treaty places serious problems before the Parties to it. This applies above all to the question of control. Control must be reliable and must be put into operation within the time-limits laid down by the Treaty.

As is well known, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons still does not eliminate the nuclear weapons themselves. For this reason it is very important at present that the nuclear Powers, and all other countries, should do everything possible to put an end to the nuclear arms race and to make progress in the cause of general and complete disarmament. The interest of a healthier international situation urgently call for this.

The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries deem it necessary to go further along this road and call upon all States to show their goodwill and readiness in practice to set about genuine disarmament. We for our part are making unremitting efforts, also within the Geneva Committee on Disarmament, to achieve agreement on the cessation of the arms race, in the first place the nuclear missile race, and on the elaboration of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. The representative of the Soviet Union in the Geneva Committee has instructions from the Soviet Government to strive for the earliest possible conclusion of an international convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological weapons and on the destruction of such weapons, and of a treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof.

The Soviet Government attaches great importance to the dialogue with the United States which began at the end of last year on questions in regard to curbing the strategic arms race. We are now preparing with the utmost earnestness for negotiations on these questions which are to begin at Vienna in April of this year. The outcome of these negotiations depends, of course, on the goodwill of the two sides.

In conclusion, allow me to express the confidence that today's deposit of the instruments of ratification by the Soviet Union, the United States and other States, signifying the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, will serve as a good stimulus towards the Treaty's acquiring a general, genuinely universal character. This is an important and necessary treaty, which meets the interests of all States and all peoples.

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CCD/280
9 March 1970
Original: ENGLISH

UNITED KINGDOM

Statement made by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, The Rt. Hon. Harold Wilson, M.P., at Lancaster House, London, on 5 March 1970, on the occasion of the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Some eighteen months ago, when the Non-Proliferation Treaty was opened for signature in Moscow, in Washington and in London, I described this treaty as the most important measure of arms control and disarmament on which agreement had yet been reached. At that historic moment we set the seal of success on nearly seven years of negotiations. Our signatures were a token of our confidence that the community of nations would agree that this was the road of wisdom.

There have been some who doubted whether there would ever be enough support to bring the treaty into force. Whenever any great endeavour is set afoot there are always doubters. In this case there may have been more than usual because the treaty needed ratification by forty-three states, about a third of the international community.

Over the months we have watched as the number of signatures and ratifications of the treaty steadily mounted; Britain ratified the treaty in the autumn of 1968. Today we have witnessed the culmination of the process, the deposit of sufficient instruments of ratification to bring the treaty into force. This ceremony, in which the distinguished representatives of our fellow depositary governments, the Ambassadors of the Soviet Union and the United States, are taking part, therefore constitutes a momentous step. It is being matched today by similar ceremonies in Moscow and Washington which are being attended by Chairman Kosygin and President Nixon.

But in our pleasure in reaching this historic milestone, let us recognize that much still remains to be done. We know that there are two forms of proliferation, vertical as well as horizontal. The countries which do not possess nuclear weapons and which are now undertaking an obligation never to possess them, have the right to expect that the nuclear weapon states will fulfil their part of the bargain. We are confident that the American and Russian negotiators will bear this obligation in mind

when they get down again next month to the complex discussions on the limitation of strategic arms, which may well themselves in turn prove the most important arms control negotiations undertaken since the last world war.

Let us remember that, although the Non-Proliferation Treaty comes into force today, there are still a number of states which have not yet adhered to the treaty. We hope that these ceremonies in the capitals of the three depositary governments will encourage those states to overcome their present hesitations and to recognise that this treaty offers to them individually and to mankind in general the best hope of avoiding nuclear war.

Finally I should like to pay on behalf of all of us a tribute to the dedicated teamwork which has brought us to this point. I am thinking particularly of the distinguished members of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva who worked with dedication and courage for so many years to lay the foundation for this treaty, and as I am speaking in London may I specially mention our own Ministers for Disarmament over this period, Lord Chalfont and Mr. Mulley. The work of this Committee shows us how goodwill and commonsense and statesmanship can triumph, whatever the political differences that separate the nations. This is perhaps the most significant and encouraging aspect of all, and augurs well for international relations in the nineteenseventies.

This is a historic occasion. It is not an end but a beginning. Now the challenge to humanity is what we can do to build on the achievement we are celebrating today.

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CCD/281
9 March 1970

Original: ENGLISH

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Remarks by President Nixon on the entry into force of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; Washington, D.C., 5 March, 1970:

Mr. Secretary, your Excellencies, the Members of the Diplomatic Corps, Members of the Senate and the House, and our distinguished guests:

With the completion of this ceremony this Treaty is now in force and has become the Law of the Land.

Mr. Secretary, I would like to be permitted something beyond that formal statement which puts the Treaty in force.

I feel that on an occasion like this, an historic occasion, it is well to pay tribute to some of those, both in our government and in other governments, who have been responsible for the success in negotiating this Treaty.

First, in our own government, I should point out that the Treaty spans three administrations -- the Kennedy Administration, the Johnson Administration, and its completion in this Administration.

It was primarily negotiated during the Johnson Administration, and we very much regret that he was unable to attend this ceremony due to an illness, which I understand will be certainly temporary. We trust that if he is looking on television that he has seen this ceremony and the culmination of, I know, what was one of his major objectives during his administration, the ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Having spoken of President Johnson and his administration, I think it is also appropriate to speak of the negotiating team. Seated at this table is William C. Foster. In speaking of him, I speak of all the men who worked with him.

I can speak with some experience in that respect. I remember on two occasions when I was in Geneva -- when I was out of office with no influence in the administration in Washington and very little influence in my own party -- Mr. Foster felt so strongly about this Treaty that he took much of his time to explain it and also to present the facts in an effective way as to why the Treaty was in the best interest of the United States, as well as the other nations involved. In other words, what was involved here was not only negotiation on his part and on the other members of his team, but a very effective and necessary program of education.

And for that long and at times very frustrating and at times almost, it seemed, impossible task, we can congratulate him and all the members of the Diplomatic Corps who worked as he did for that Treaty.

And on this occasion, too, I wish to pay respect to the Members of the House and the Senate that are here.

This Treaty indicates both the continuity of American foreign policy in its search for a just peace, and it also indicates its bipartisan character -- because without bipartisan support in the Senate, where the Treaty received the consent of the Senate, and bipartisan support in the House as well, this Treaty could not go into effect as it has today.

And, finally, I wish to pay tribute and express appreciation to all the representatives of the other governments that are present here today.

The fact that so many governments have brought this Treaty into effect is an indication of the immense desire that exists among all people in the world to reduce the danger of war and to find a way peacefully to settle our differences.

This is indeed an historic occasion. As I sit here today, I only hope that those of us who were fortunate enough to be present will look back one day and see that this was the first milestone on a road which led to reducing the danger of nuclear war and on a road which led to lasting peace among nations.

This milestone, as has already been indicated, results in non-proliferation of nuclear weapons to the extent that the nations participating in this ceremony and who have ratified the Treaty have indicated.

The next milestone we trust will be the limitation of nuclear weapons, the historic strategic arms limitation talks which will enter their second phase on April 16 in Vienna. And we note the fact that when Prime Minister Kosygin signed the Treaty in Moscow today, reference was made to those talks.

We trust that on April 16 the climate for progress in those talks will be good and that we can at some time in the future look forward to a ceremony in which we note the ratification of that historic treaty.

And then finally, of course, we trust that the third milestone will be continued progress in reducing the political tensions, the differences between governments

which make it necessary for us to consider that we must maintain armed forces to the degree that we maintain them.

This is the work of all of us, the work of the diplomats, the work of the men of peace and all of us I think can be so described today.

And so, Mr. Secretary, on this historic occasion, let us trust that we will look back and say that this was one of the first and major steps in that process in which the nations of the world moved from a period of confrontation to a period of negotiation and a period of lasting peace.

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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11 March 1970
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STATEMENT OF SECRETARY-GENERAL ON OCCASION OF ENTRY INTO FORCE OF TREATY ON NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, ON 5 MARCH 1970

It is with deep satisfaction that I welcome the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Thus, many years of persistent efforts and intensive negotiations in the United Nations and in the Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament are finally coming to fruition.

It is hardly necessary for me to stress the importance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which has been widely acclaimed as the most important international agreement in the field of disarmament since the nuclear age began. In preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons and in establishing a safeguards system for verifying the faithful implementation of its obligations, the Treaty cannot fail to play a very significant role in containing the nuclear arms race.

At the same time, the Treaty promotes the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and creates most favourable conditions for the development of a wide international co-operation in this field. In this regard, the Treaty not only reaffirms the inalienable right of all Parties to develop research and the production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, it also provides that all the Parties will facilitate and have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for this purpose.

It should also be stressed that the Treaty is not an end in itself but a step towards disarmament and that the Treaty imposes on all Parties a solemn obligation to pursue negotiations on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race, to nuclear disarmament and to general and complete disarmament. This is a most pressing task for the future and the Parties to the Treaty, and especially the nuclear-weapon Powers, have a great responsibility in fulfilling the obligation they have accepted under the terms of the Treaty.

I note with great satisfaction that as of today almost one hundred States have already signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Now that the Treaty has entered into force, those States which have not yet signed or ratified it will undoubtedly be encouraged to take positive action to contribute to the universality of the Treaty, so that it may fully achieve its objectives. It is my firm belief that it is in the best interests of the world community that the Non-Proliferation Treaty should command universal support.

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CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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16 March 1970
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Working Paper on Chemical Warfare Agents and the Commercial Chemical Industry

1. Chemical agents, the effects of their use in warfare, and the possibility of subjecting such agents to arms control have been studied extensively in recent years. The reports of the United Nations Secretary-General, World Health Organization, and SIPRI have received worldwide attention. In addition, studies of this problem have been conducted by individual nations. The United States Government completed a thorough review of this subject in the Fall of 1969.

2. In considering the possibility of negotiating a new arms control agreement for chemical weapons, one of the areas which must be studied and understood is the relationship between the production of chemical agents for war and the production of chemicals for peaceful purposes by the commercial chemical industry. The chemical industry was in its infancy during World War I, when chemical warfare was first employed. Even so, in that conflict more than 100,000 tons of chemicals were produced for use as weapons, and 1,300,000 deaths and casualties were reported from the use of poison gas. Since World War I, many additional countries have developed a chemical industry, and the chemical production facilities of the more advanced countries have increased tremendously. In the 50 years since the end of World War I, for example, gross production of the worldwide chemical industry has increased in value from an estimated $5 billion to $150 billion, approximately a 30-fold increase. Between 1959 and 1969, world output of chemicals increased from an estimated $60 billion to $150 billion, and the magnitude of increase is continuing to accelerate.

3. Many of the chemicals which caused death and casualties in World War I are today produced in large quantities for industrial use. These chemicals might have military utility for states which may be unable, or might not desire, to manufacture or import modern nerve agents. For example, among the choking agents, which resulted in more than 80 per cent of the deaths by gas in World War I, phosgene is currently produced in a number of countries. Annual production figures are unknown, but in at least some of these countries, annual production is thought to exceed 100,000 tons.

Phosgene is a widely used raw material in the manufacture of synthetic plastics, insecticides, paints, and pharmaceuticals. Being easily liquified, industrial phosgene could be diverted relatively easily for use in war should a nation decide to employ it, without necessarily requiring sophisticated delivery systems.

4. Among the blood gases developed during World War I, hydrogen cyanide (hydrocyanic acid) is a valuable intermediate in the manufacture of many organic chemical compounds, including benzyl cyanide, acrylonitrile, and dyes. Its world production volume is believed to be in excess of 1 million tons annually. Hydrogen cyanide is currently being produced by the United States, 6 Western European countries, Japan, the USSR, and Communist China. Another blood gas which also finds widespread commercial use is cyanogen chloride. It was used in limited quantities in World War I and is presently used as a fumigant and industrial intermediate.

5. Mustard gas, which was the most effective chemical weapon developed in World War I, is produced very simply from ethylene-oxide. On a worldwide basis, over one million tons of ethylene-oxide are produced annually for use, inter alia, in manufacturing detergents and disinfectants. The improper disposal of commercial mustard gas intermediates by industrial users has led on several occasions to casualties among fishermen and bathers, and has resulted in charges that mustard gas itself was the cause of injury.

6. The everyday production of commercial materials relevant to chemical warfare in the United States, as in other industrially developed countries, is quite substantial. For example, there are 19 locations for phosgene production and 11 facilities for hydrogen cyanide production in the United States. These produce in total approximately 350,000 tons of phosgene and 200,000 tons of hydrogen cyanide per year for commercial purposes. Of course, if one looks back into the commercial production of basic raw materials (for example, ethylene, sulphur, and chlorine, which are ingredients for mustard gas), the problem is much larger and the facilities more extensive.

7. Chemical agents of the World War I type, even though they may be effective against an unprepared enemy, are considered by those who have studied chemical weapons to be much less effective than the more recently discovered "nerve agents." The G and V families of organophosphorus nerve agents were discovered in 1936 and 1955, respectively, in the course of research on new commercial pesticides. These agents are similar to commercial organophosphorus pesticides, widely used in agriculture, which have, in fact, caused human deaths in cases of misuse. Both the nerve gases and

these related pesticides inhibit the enzyme acetylcholinesterase, causing death from respiratory and circulatory failure.

8. In addition to the similarities between the end products, many intermediates such as phosphorus trichloride, phosphorus oxychloride, ethyl and isopropyl alcohol, and ammonia are common to the production of pesticides and nerve agents. All are common industrial chemicals. In the mid-1960's, annual production of organophosphorus pesticides in the United States alone was approximately 30,000 tons. Present United States output is approximately 65,000 tons of organophosphorus pesticides per year, produced in the facilities of 14 basic manufacturers. Elsewhere in the world, there are at least 50 plants involved in the production or formulation, or both, of commercial organophosphorus pesticides in a total of 12 countries, including countries of Western and Eastern Europe. The total world output of the entire organophosphorus pesticide industry is estimated to be in excess of 130,000 tons annually.

9. The basic technical information for production of nerve agents, including descriptions of the chemical processes and amounts of raw materials required, is in the public domain. Such production does not present any insurmountable technical difficulties, although the problem of maintaining safety for plant personnel is, in view of the deadly character of the agents, quite complex.

10. From the foregoing discussion, it can be seen that the capacity for producing chemical warfare agents grows out of, and is linked to the commercial chemical industry of a given country. The raw materials for various chemical warfare agents, and even some agents themselves, are produced in vast amounts in a great many locations throughout the world.

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CCD/284
8 April 1970

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 30 MARCH 1970 FROM THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO THE CO-CHAIRMEN OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING GENERAL ASSEMBLY DOCUMENT A/7967

I have the honour to recall that in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2604A (XXIV), I circulated on 30 January 1970 a letter to the Governments mentioned in operative paragraph 1 of the resolution, requesting certain information in the context of the creation of a world-wide exchange of seismological data which would facilitate the achievement of a comprehensive test ban.

I have the honour to transmit herewith, in pursuance of operative paragraph 3 of the resolution, for the information of the members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, the text of General Assembly document A/7967*, circulating the substantive portions of the responses to my letter of 30 January, received from Governments as of 29 March 1970.

Accept, Sirs, the assurances of my highest consideration.

U Thant
Secretary-General

*Document A/7967, containing replies from Dahomey, Ethiopia, Laos, Nauru, San Marino, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Republic of Tanzania, has been circulated to all Governments mentioned in operative paragraph 1 of resolution 2604A (XXIV), including all the members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

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